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Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors
in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
Abstract
We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a ven-
ture capitalist (VC)—entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and
chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO
timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results
also indicate that the manager’s compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral
hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when
the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.
JEL Classification Codes: D82, D86, G24, G34, M12, M51.




This paper examines the situation in which the joint provision of costly effort by a manager
and an advisor initially improves the productivity of a project in a firm. However, after a
substantial upward shift in productivity is achieved through irreversible investment, the
role of the advisor ends, and only the manager remains to provide ongoing costly effort to
improve the productivity of the project. Because the timing of investment corresponds with
the timing of the change in the role of the advisor, optimal timing of investment needs to
consider the effect of this change. A difficulty may therefore arise if the manager’s costly
effort is unobservable. In this case, not only the advisor’s costly effort but also the manager’s
compensation may be controlled so as to provide the manager with appropriate incentives.
In addition, the advisor’s costly effort may be unobservable. Consequently, we must consider
the provision of incentives for effort for both the manager and the advisor when solving the
optimal timing problem of investment.
This particular situation typically arises when a venture capitalist (VC) exerts substantial
effort in monitoring managerial activity, providing managerial advice to entrepreneurs, and
choosing the optimal timing of both the initial public offering (IPO) and any investment
financed by the IPO. Indeed, the monitoring and advisory role of the VC through ongoing
long-term involvement can increase the value of its portfolio companies.1 The VC often par-
ticipates directly in management by holding one or more positions on the board of directors.
The VC also specializes in a particular industry and uses those industry contacts to help
entrepreneurs to perform various business activities.2 Furthermore, some VCs employ con-
sulting staff that are involved in the management of companies in their portfolios. However,
it is difficult to verify the intensity of such monitoring and advising efforts provided by the
1The monitoring and advisory role of the VC is empirically documented by Barry et al. (1990), Gompers
and Lerner (1999), Hellmann and Puri (2002), and Kaplan and Strömberg (2004).
2For example, the VC helps to shape and recruit the management team, to shape the strategy and
the business model before and after investing, to assist in production, to line up suppliers, and to develop
customer relations.
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VC.3 The VC can harvest investments in private companies in one of two ways: namely, by
taking the firm public via an IPO or by selling the firm to another company (mergers and
acquisitions (M&A)). In fact, we can interpret the IPO process in this paper as an M&A
process if the acquiring company’s activity or investment has a synergetic effect on the ac-
quired firm’s productivity. Hence, we use the terms of the “IPO” and “M&A” processes for
the VC exit route interchangeably.4
To capture this dynamic problem, we develop a continuous-time agency model with double
moral hazard, in which a risk-neutral agent (manager) provides unobservable value-adding
effort and a risk-neutral principal (advisor) also contributes unobservable value-adding effort
as well as choosing the optimal timing of changing her role with irreversible investment. The
basic question that we address is how the optimal timing of changing the advisor’s role and
the dynamic properties of optimal incentive provision are characterized under double moral
hazard, compared with those under single moral hazard. We further explore the comparative
statics regarding the timings of changing the advisor’s role and compensating the manager,
and provide several empirical implications.
In our basic model, the project generates cumulative cash flows that are affected by both
the principal’s and the manager’s efforts. There are complementarities between the value-
adding efforts of the principal and the manager. The principal also chooses the timing of
exiting; that is, the timing of the IPO and investment for achieving an upward shift in the
3The literature on optimal venture capital contracts makes a similar assumption. See Casamatta (2003),
Schmidt (2003), Repullo and Suarez (2004), Inderst and Müller (2004), and Hellmann (2006). However, they
use a discrete-time agency model with two or three periods, which is not suitable for the analysis of either
IPO timing or dynamic optimal incentive provision.
4A similar situation occurs when buyout funds attempt to make private firms in their portfolio go public
or when banks attempt to return bankrupt firms under their administration to public ownership. Another
example is where a large established firm sells all of its claims in a joint venture with a small innovative
firm or where a parent firm spins off one of its subsidiaries to its own shareholders and makes the subsidiary
a new entity that is managed independently of the parent firm. With joint venture dissolution, as the
large established firm provides resources in areas such as manufacturing, distribution, and marketing, the
large-established-firm—small-innovative-firm relationship acts like a VC—entrepreneur relationship. With cor-
porate spin-offs, the parent firm’s CEO—subsidiary manager relationship corresponds to a VC—entrepreneur
relationship if the CEO’s objective is to maximize the initial shareholders’ payoff where the CEO is not
involved in the management of the subsidiary following a spin-off. In both cases, restructuring costs need
to be expended at the time of the dissolution or spin-off. Evidence of operating performance improvements
following spin-offs is in Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999).
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productivity of the project. Following the IPO, new outside investors own the firm and
induce the manager to exert an unobservable effort to operate the project, although they
cannot themselves expend any effort to operate the project.
Now, suppose as a benchmark the single moral hazard case in which the principal’s ef-
fort is observable and verifiable. Although the manager’s effort is unobservable, he has an
incentive to increase effort if his value depends more strongly on output. Hence, increas-
ing volatility of the manager’s value is required to attain a higher level of effort from the
manager. However, this implies that poor results are met with penalties. As the manager’s
limited liability precludes negative wages, the project has to be terminated inefficiently once
his future discounted payoff–that is, his continuation value–hits his outside option. Thus,
there exists a trade-off between more incentive provision and inefficient termination. This
also means that paying cash to the manager earlier makes future inefficient liquidation more
likely, as it reduces the manager’s continuation payoff. Hence, the possibility of inefficient
liquidation causes deferred compensation. Furthermore, if costly investment is irreversible,
the possibility of inefficient termination makes IPO execution more costly because the invest-
ment cost is less likely to be recovered. Hence, there exists another trade-off between earlier
IPO timing and inefficient termination. This trade-off creates an option value of waiting for
an IPO. In addition, the change in the governance mechanism with the IPO needs to be
considered in choosing the timing of the IPO, because this substantially affects the merit of
the IPO via the significant effect on the manager’s incentives.
We next suppose the double moral hazard case in which the principal’s effort is unob-
servable. Then, the principal may reduce her effort ex post because she may not be able to
commit to secure an appropriate ex post incentive for herself. The possibility of a decrease
in the principal’s effort may reduce the option value of waiting for the IPO (or the principal’s
expected profit obtained by waiting for the IPO), thereby advancing the IPO timing. This
possibility may also have an adverse effect on the cost of compensating the manager for his
effort and may make earlier compensation more costly under double moral hazard. However,
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we will show that this final intuition is incorrect.
The main results of the model are as follows. Our first main result is that optimal IPO
timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Intuitively,
the principal’s effort supplied prior to the IPO is smaller under double moral hazard than
under single moral hazard. The reason is that under double moral hazard, the principal
has an ex post incentive to reduce her effort level, relative to that optimally obtained under
single moral hazard, because she cannot internalize the externality effect of her effort on the
manager’s incentives when choosing the level of effort after the contract has been offered.
This reduces the option value of waiting for the IPO, thus advancing the IPO timing.
The second main result is that the manager’s compensation tends to be paid earlier under
double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Intuitively, the manager’s compensa-
tion is never paid before the IPO under either double or single moral hazard. Given that the
cash payment threshold is located after the IPO and that only single moral hazard situation
arises after the IPO, the compensation payment timing is earlier under double moral hazard
because the IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard.
We carry out comparative statics for the IPO timing and the manager’s compensation
timing under double moral hazard. In particular, we show that the IPO is more likely to
be brought forward when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and the volatility of
cash flows is larger. Our results provide testable predictions about IPO timing and vesting
provisions for the manager in early-stage start-up firms, management buyout firms, or firms
reorganized following bankruptcy. These predictions can also be tested for the dissolution
of joint ventures and for corporate spin-offs.
Practically, some VCs retain a fraction of the firm’s shares and continue to hold their
board positions even after the IPO. If the principal retains a portion of the equity claims in
the firm and continues to provide effort after the IPO, a multiagent problem may arise after
the IPO. We extend our model to this case and show that most of our main results still hold.
Our work in this paper is related to the growing literature on continuous-time agency mod-
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els using the martingale techniques developed by Sannikov (2008).5 Philippon and Sannikov
(2007) extend the cash diversion model in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) by considering an
endogenous shift in the timing in the mean of cash flows by irreversible investment or IPO.
However, in Philippon and Sannikov (2007), the principal supplies no effort. Indeed, the
main difference between our model and the aforementioned continuous-time agency models
is that our model deals with a double moral hazard situation in which the principal ex-
erts unobservable effort before making an irreversible investment and exiting the firm. This
enables us to investigate how the principal’s moral hazard affects the optimal timing of or-
ganizational change and the optimal properties of dynamic contracts, and to explore the
interplay between organizational change and the optimal properties of dynamic contracts.
In particular, unlike Philippon and Sannikov (2007), we can capture the effect of a change in
the ownership structure or governance on the optimal IPO timing and compensation profile
for the manager.6 Furthermore, if the principal does not completely exit with the IPO, we
are able to explore a continuous-time multiagent model following the IPO.
Several existing studies have implications for firm characteristics during IPOs. Pagano
and Röell (1998) examine the effect of ownership structure on the decision to go public.
However, their model is static. Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) and Pástor, Taylor,
and Veronesi (2009) employ a dynamic IPO model by trading off the diversification benefits
of going public against the benefits of private control. Both of these models suggest that
going public is optimal when cash flow or the firm’s expected future profitability is sufficiently
high. However, they do not use the continuous-time agency model, nor do they explore the
effect of the change in managerial control with the IPO (VC advice and monitoring vs.
market discipline) on the IPO timing or the manager’s compensation profile.
5See DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), He (2009), Biais, Mar-
iotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010), Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010), Jovanovic and Prat (2010), Piskorski and
Tchistyi (2010), He (2011), and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2012). The continuous-time agency
model began with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). However, unlike recent models, they assume that the
agent can receive a lump-sum payment only at the end of an exogenous finite time interval.
6Our result–that the greater the need for the VC’s monitoring role, the higher the IPO timing threshold–
is novel. Furthermore, Philippon and Sannikov (2007) suggest that the IPO threshold is increasing in
volatility. By contrast, our result shows that the IPO threshold may be decreasing in the risk of the project.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Sections 3 and 4
derive an optimal contract under single and double moral hazard. Section 5 considers the
comparative statics. Section 6 allows the principal not to exit completely with the IPO.
Section 7 provides empirical implications for our results, and Section 8 concludes. All proofs
appear in the Appendix.
2. Basic Model
We now consider a continuous-time model in which a principal hires an agent to operate a
firm and has an opportunity to improve the firm’s output process substantially by undertak-
ing irreversible investment K when the principal exits. In the subsequent analysis, we take
as an example an IPO for a private company presently under the control of a VC or buyout
fund. The principal (the VC or buyout fund) hires a manager and then has an opportunity
to exit with an IPO. The investment cost K is paid by the funds financed from new outside
investors in the IPO.
Let Xt denote the cumulative cash flows produced by the firm up to time t. The total
output Xt evolves according to
dXt = Atdt+ σdZt, (1)
where At is the drift of the cash flows, σ is the instantaneous volatility, and Z = {Zt,Ft; 0 ≤
t < ∞}, which is a standard Brownian motion on the complete probability space (Ω,F ,Q).
Specifically, before the investment with the IPO, At is represented by At = aAt + ζaPt +
αaAtaPt, where aAt is the manager’s effort, aPt the principal’s effort, ζ a constant nonnegative
scale adjusted parameter, and α a constant nonnegative complementarity parameter. As the
principal makes an effort to monitor and advise the manager in order to improve the firm’s
business,7 the efforts of the principal and the manager are interrelated before the IPO.
7In the monitoring—auditing model of Townsend (1979), the informed agent asks for costly state verifi-
cation so that the realization of the project returns is made known to the uninformed agent. As the costly
verification in equilibrium occurs only in the low-revenue states, the monitoring and auditing in his model
naturally corresponds to bankruptcy proceedings. Hence, the monitoring and auditing cannot increase the
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However, after the investment with the IPO, for μ > 1, At = μaAt. If the IPO is undertaken,
the principal exits, and the firm is now owned by new outside investors. Thus, aPt = 0.
However, the scale of the firm expands because of the investment; thus, μ > 1.
The principal and new outside investors are risk neutral and discount the flow of profit at
rate r. The principal’s effort is a stochastic process {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I} progressively
measurable with respect to Ft, where the set of her feasible effort levels AP is compact with
the smallest element 0, and τ I is the time of the IPO. The principal’s effort cost function
g(aPt)–measured in the same units as the flow of profit–is an increasing, convex, and C2
function. We normalize g(0) = 0.
The manager is risk neutral, but a negative wage is ruled out by limited liability. The
manager also discounts his consumption at γ (> r).8 If the manager’s savings interest rate
is lower than the principal’s discount rate and if the manager is risk neutral, DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2006) show that there is an optimal contract in which the manager maintains
zero savings. Hence, in this model, the manager can be restricted to consuming what the
principal pays him at any time. For simplicity, we assume that at each point of time, the
manager can choose either to shirk (aAt = 0) or to work (aAt = 1), where AA = {0, 1}.
Because working is costly for the manager or shirking results in a private benefit, we also
suppose that the manager receives a flow of private benefit equal to hdt if he shirks.
The total output process {Xt, 0≤ t <∞} is publicly observable by all the agents. However,
neither the principal nor new outside investors can observe {aAt ∈ AA, 0 ≤ t < ∞} or the
flow of the manager’s private benefit, whereas the manager may observe and verify {aPt ∈
AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I} or may not observe {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I}.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I , the principal signs a contract with the manager at time t = 0 that specifies
productivity of the firm. By contrast, in our model, the principal, who is uninformed about the manager’s
effort, monitors and advises the manager, who is informed or uninformed about the principal’s effort, as
discussed in the introduction. As a result, the monitoring and advising in our model can increase the
productivity of the firm although it cannot make the manager’s effort known to the principal.
8If the principal and the manager are equally patient when the manager is risk neutral, the principal
can postpone payments to the manager indefinitely. This possibility precludes the existence of an optimal
contract. See Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010).
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how the manager’s nondecreasing cumulative consumption, Ct, depends on the observation
of Xt.9 If the manager can observe and verify {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I}, the contract can
also stipulate how aPt depends on the observation of Xt. Let Π = {Ct, aPt : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I}
denote the contract prior to the IPO if the manager can observe and verify {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤
t ≤ τ I}; and ΠD = {Ct : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I} denote the contract prior to the IPO if the manager
cannot observe {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I}. On the other hand, for τ I ≤ t < ∞, new outside
investors sign a contract with the manager at time t = τ I that specifies how Ct depends on
the observation of Xt. Let Π = {Ct : τ I ≤ t < ∞} denote the contract after the IPO. The
principal and new outside investors are able to commit to any such contract. In addition, the
principal determines how the time of the IPO, τ I , depends on the observation of Xt and how
the time when the contract is terminated before the IPO, τT0 , depends on the observation
of Xt. New outside investors also determine how the time when the contract is terminated
after the IPO, τT1, depends on the observation of Xt.
Now, for any contract Π (or ΠD) and Π and for any time (τ I , τT0 , τT1), suppose that
the manager chooses an effort-level process {aAt ∈ AA, 0 ≤ t < ∞}. The manager’s total















where τT0I = min(τT0 , τ I); 1τI≥τT0 = 1 or 0 (1τI<τT0 = 0 or 1) according to τ I ≥ τT0 or
τ I < τT0 ; and the manager receives expected payoff R from an outside option when the
contract is terminated, irrespective of whether the IPO occurs. In addition, for any contract
Π (or ΠD) and Π and for any time (τ I , τT0, τT1), suppose that the principal and the manager
choose effort-level processes {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I} and {aAt ∈ AA, 0 ≤ t <∞}. Then, the
9Because a negative wage is ruled out, Ct must be nondecreasing.
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where L0 (L1) is the expected liquidation payoff of the principal (new outside investors) when
the contract is terminated before (after) the IPO. Note that at t = τ I , new outside investors
buy the firm via the IPO. The principal anticipates an incentive for the manager to choose
his effort level after the IPO and sets the IPO price reasonably. Because of arbitration, the
principal’s profit from the IPO equals the total expected payoff of new outside investors at
t = τ I exclusive of the IPO cost, represented by the third and fourth terms in (3).10
3. Optimal Contract under Single Moral Hazard
In this section, we assume that the manager can observe and verify {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤
τ I}. The game is solved through backward induction.
3.1. Optimal contract after the IPO.–
Consider the case where the IPO has already taken place. The contracting problem is then
to find a combination of an incentive-compatible contract and termination timing, (Π, τT1),
and an incentive-compatible choice of the manager’s effort process, {aAt ∈ AA, τ I ≤ t ≤
τT1}, that maximize the expected profit of new outside investors subject to delivering to the
manager a required payoffWI at the IPO, whereWI is defined by the manager’s continuation
value Wt at t = τ I given below. The manager’s effort process is incentive compatible if it




e−γ(t−τI) [dCt + h · (1− aAt)dt] + e−γ(τT1−τI)R
¾
.
10In corporate spin-offs, the shares of the subsidiary are distributed on a pro rata basis to the parent firm’s
shareholders. If the principal is the parent firm’s CEO whose preferences therefore coincide with those of
the parent firm’s shareholders, her objective function is still given by (3) because she is not involved in the
management of the spun-off subsidiary.
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For any (Π, τT1), the manager’s continuation value Wt is his future expected discounted




e−γs [dCs + h · (1− aAs)ds] + e−γ(τT1−t)R
¾
. (4)
The manager’s effort process is then specified by {aA(Wt) : τ I ≤ t ≤ τT1}.11 Denote by
G(W ) the value function of new outside investors before deducting the investment cost K
(the highest expected present value of the profit in an optimal contract). For simplicity, we
assume that G(W ) is concave. The formal proof for the concavity of G(W ) is provided in
the Appendix. We assume that implementing the manager’s high effort aA(Wt) = 1 at any
t ∈ [τ I , τT1] is optimal for new outside investors, and provide a sufficient condition for the
optimality of implementing this action in the Appendix.
The optimal contract is now derived using the technique in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006)
and Sannikov (2008). Specifically, for any (Π, τT1), there exists a progressively measurable
process {Yt,Ft : τ I ≤ t ≤ τT1} in L∗ such that12
dWt = {γWt − h · [1− aA(Wt)]}dt− dCt + Y (Wt)[dXt − μaA(Wt)dt]. (5)
The evolution of Wt in (5) includes the sensitivity of Wt to output, Y (Wt). This suggests
that we can characterize the manager’s incentive compatibility by considering Y (Wt). Indeed,
implementing aA(Wt) = 1 is incentive compatible if and only if Y (W1) ≥ β1 for t ∈ [τ I , τT1 ],
where β1 ≡ min {y : yμ ≥ h} = hμ .
As proved in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), the marginal cost of delivering W can never
exceed the cost of an immediate transfer in terms of the utility of new outside investors;
G0(W ) ≥ −1. Define W++ as the lowest value of W such that G0(W ) = −1. Then, it is
optimal to set the manager’s compensation as dC = max (W −W++, 0).
11As the manager’s cumulative consumption Ct is defined as a mapping from the history of Ft to a
nondecreasing process, it may be more general than a function of Wt. Hence, we simply write it by Ct.





<∞ for all t ∈ [0,∞).
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Now, the following proposition summarizes the optimal contract after the IPO.
Proposition 1: For the manager’s starting value WI ∈ [R, W++], the optimal contract
is characterized by the unique concave function G(W ) that satisfies the Hamilton—Jacobi—
Bellman (HJB) equation
rG(W ) = max
Y≥β1




with β1 = hμ and boundary conditions G(R) = L1, G0(W++) = −1, and G00(W++) = 0.13
When Wt ∈ [R, W++), dCt = 0. When Wt = W++, payments dCt cause Wt to reflect at
W++. If Wt > W++, an immediate payment Wt−W++ is made. The contract is terminated
at time τT1 when Wt hits R for the first time. The optimal contract then attains profit G(WI)
for new outside investors.14
As G00(W ) < 0, new outside investors dislike volatility in W and optimally choose the
sensitivity of W to output; that is, Y = β1 = hμ in (6). Using (6), G0(W++) = −1, and
G00(W++) = 0, we obtain rG(W++) + γW++ = μ; that is, payment to the manager is
postponed until the new outside investors’ and the manager’s required expected returns
exhaust the available expected cash flows generated after the IPO.
3.2. Optimal contract before the IPO.–
In this case, the contracting problem is to find a combination of an incentive-compatible
contract and IPO and termination timing, (Π, τ I , τT0), and an incentive-compatible man-
ager’s effort process, {aAt ∈ AA, 0 ≤ t < ∞}, that maximize the expected profit of the
principal subject to delivering to the manager an initial required payoff W0. The manager’s
13The first boundary condition is the value-matching condition, which implies that the principal must
terminate the contract to hold the agent’s reservation value, R. The second boundary condition is the
smooth-pasting condition, which guarantees the optimal choice of W++. The third boundary condition is
the super contract condition for the optimal choice ofW++, which requires that the second derivatives match
at the boundary.
14For any starting value of WI > W++, G(WI) is an upper bound on the total expected profit of new
outside investors. However, this case can be excluded because F 0(WI) = G0(WI) > −1, as is shown in
Proposition 2. If WI < R, the manager never participates in the contract.
13
effort process is incentive compatible if it maximizes his total expected payoff defined by (2),
given (Π, τ I , τT0).
Given Wt as in (4), the processes of the manager’s and principal’s efforts can be specified
by {aA(Wt), aP (Wt) : 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}. Denote by F (W ) the value function of the principal.
To facilitate our discussion, we assume that F (W ) is concave. The formal proof for the
concavity of F (W ) is provided in the Appendix.
We again assume that implementing aA(Wt) = 1 at any t ∈ [0, τT0I ] is optimal for the
principal, and provide a sufficient condition for such optimality in the Appendix. We also
make the following assumption, which ensures that the IPO does not take place at time 0 if
W0 is not sufficiently large.
Assumption 1: K > max(L0, L1).
As in Section 3.1, we can characterize the evolution of Wt, the manager’s incentive com-
patibility, and the manager’s compensation as follows. First, for any (Π, τ I , τT0), there exists
a progressively measurable process {Yt,Ft : 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I} in L∗ such that
dWt = {γWt − h · [1− aA(Wt)]} dt−dCt+Y (Wt){dXt−[aA(Wt)+ζaP (Wt)+αaA(Wt)aP (Wt)]dt}.
(7)
Second, implementing aA(Wt) = 1 is incentive compatible if and only if Y (Wt) ≥ β0(aP (Wt))
for t ∈ [0, τT0I ], where β0(aP ) = min {y : y · (1 + αaP ) ≥ h} = h1+αaP . Finally, the optimality
of the contract implies F 0(W ) ≥ −1. Hence, it is optimal to pay the manager according to
dC = max (W − W+, 0), where W+ is defined as the lowest value of W such that F 0(W ) =
−1. In fact, as in Proposition 2 below, we will show that W+ ≥ WI . Thus, the manager’s
compensation is zero before the IPO.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal contract before the IPO.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the manager can observe and verify {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤
τT0I}. For any starting value W0 ∈ [R,WI ], the optimal contract is characterized by the
14
unique concave function F (W ) (≥ G(W ) − K) that satisfies the HJB equation
rF (W ) = max
aP∈AP ,Y≥β0(aP )




with β0(aP ) = h1+αaP and boundary conditions F (R) = L0, F (WI) = G(WI) − K, and
F 0(WI) = G0(WI).15 When Wt ∈ [R,WI ], dCt = 0. This means WI ≤ W+. The IPO
occurs when Wt reaches WI (> R), or the contract is terminated when Wt hits R, whichever
happens sooner. After the IPO, the continuation contract is given by Proposition 1 at the
starting value WI. The optimal contract then provides profit F (W0) to the principal.16
As F 00(W ) < 0, the principal optimally chooses Y = β0(aP ) = h1+αaP in (8).
We now discuss the optimal solution in more detail. Inspecting the results of Propositions
1 and 2 shows that the manager’s compensation is never paid before the IPO, but is paid
with a cash payment immediately after the IPO when Wt > W++. The intuition is that if
the manager receives compensation before the IPO (that is, W+ < WI), the principal must
pay Wt − W+ to the manager immediately. As this immediate payment causes Wt to be
brought back to W+ for any Wt ∈ (W+, ∞), it follows from W+ < WI that the principal’s
profit from the IPO always becomes smaller than her expected profit obtained by waiting
for the IPO. Hence, the IPO would never be done.
For the optimal choice of aP , it follows from β0(aP ) = h1+αaP that if aP > 0, the first-order
condition leads to
ζ + α = g0(aP (W ))− F 00(W )σ2β0(aP (W ))β00(aP (W ))
≤ g0(aP (W )) for all W ≤WI , with strict inequality only if α > 0.
This implies that the marginal productivity of aP is smaller than its marginal cost when α
15The first and second boundary conditions are the value-matching conditions, while the third boundary
condition is the smooth-pasting condition that guarantees the optimal choice of WI . Note that the IPO cost
is K, which is deducted from G(WI).
16For the starting value of W0 > WI , the IPO takes place immediately or contracts with positive profit
do not exist. If W0 < R, the manager never participates in the contract.
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> 0. Intuitively, an increase in aP relaxes the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint
because of the complementarity effect of the principal’s effort (β00(aP (W )) < 0 for α > 0).
Hence, an increase in aP reduces the cost of the principal exposing the manager to income
uncertainty to provide incentive. Thus, to provide the manager with appropriate less costly
incentives using the complementarity effect, the principal increases aP by a level at which
the marginal productivity of aP is smaller than its marginal cost.
To conclude this section, we comment on the IPO timing. If the IPO is implemented,
the investment cost arises at the time of the IPO. However, there is a risk of losing value
if the contract is terminated. Because L1 < K implies that the liquidation value cannot
compensate for the investment cost, it is inefficient to plan the IPO when there is a higher
probability of liquidation. As a result, a sufficiently small Wt close to R raises the risk of
losing value upon termination and reduces the IPO price, thereby making it impossible for
the principal to recover the total cost of the IPO.17 Hence, it is optimal to execute the IPO
only when the manager accumulates a sufficiently large Wt. In addition, the optimal IPO
timing is affected by both the agency problem and the change in the governance mechanism.
For example, if the change in the governance mechanism with the IPO affects the post-IPO
agency relation and the post-IPO firm value, it will affect the timing of the IPO.
4. Optimal Contract under Double Moral Hazard
In this section, we assume that the manager cannot observe {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}. This
assumption can be justified because it is difficult to verify the intensity of the monitoring
and advising efforts provided by the VC. Even in this case, a different formulation of the
contract problem is required only before the IPO because the principal does not provide any
effort after the IPO. Hence, Proposition 1 still holds.
Before the IPO, the principal’s design for the incentive scheme must address the manager’s
17On the other hand, if W0 is sufficiently large, and if contracts with positive profit exist, it is optimal for
the principal to execute the IPO at t = 0 immediately because she can recover the cost of the IPO.
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incentive problem and her own incentive problem.18 Thus, the optimal contracting problem
prior to the IPO is to find a combination of an incentive-compatible contract and IPO and
termination timing, (ΠD, τ I , τT0), an incentive-compatible manager’s effort process, {aAt ∈
AA, 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}, and an incentive-compatible principal’s effort process, {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤
t ≤ τT0I}, that maximize the expected profit of the principal subject to delivering to the
manager an initial required payoff W0. The manager’s effort process is incentive compatible
if it maximizes his total expected utility defined by (2), given (ΠD, τ I , τT0 , {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t
≤ τT0I}), while the principal’s effort process is incentive compatible if it maximizes her total
expected payoff defined by (3), given (ΠD, τ I , τT0, {aAt ∈ AA, 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}). Denote byeF (W ) the value function of the principal in this case. For simplicity, we assume that eF (W )
is concave; the formal proof is shown in the Appendix. We still assume that implementing
aA(Wt) = 1 at any t ∈ [0, τT0I ] is optimal for the principal, and provide a sufficient condition
for such optimality in the Appendix.
Indeed, the discussion in Section 3.2 still applies for the evolution ofWt and the incentive-
compatibility constraint for the manager. However, the incentive-compatible principal’s
effort process is determined by the maximizer to the following maximization problem, given
the optimal level of ΠD, τ I , τT0 , {aAt ∈ AA, 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}, and eF (W ):
aP = argmax
aP∈AP
1 + (ζ + α)aP − g(aP ) + eF 0(W )γW + eF 00(W )
2
[Y (W )]2 σ2. (9)
Here, Y (W ) is given by aP (W ): Y (W ) = β0(aP (W )), where aP (W ) is the recommended
principal’s effort at each point ofW .19 Note that after offering the contract, the principal can
optimally choose her effort at each point of W without considering the manager’s incentive-
18In our model, if the principal makes dCt sufficiently large at some t0 to penalize herself severely when
the cash flows are very low, then Wt for t > t0 will be smaller than R. Thus, the possibility of contract
termination implies that the principal cannot arbitrarily reduce the low outcome range in which she should
take the penalty by increasing the penalty amount. Hence, in our dynamic setting, in contrast to the static
double moral hazard model, such as that in Kim and Wang (1998), the double moral hazard case cannot
arbitrarily closely approach the single moral hazard case, even though there is no upper bound for the wage
contract.
19In other words, the recommended Y (W ) is set equal to β0(aP (W )) under the optimal contract.
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compatibility constraint, if the manager cannot observe {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}. To ensure
that aP > 0 under the optimal contract, we assume that g0(0) < ζ + α. Then, as the right-
hand side of (9) is concave with respect to aP , (9) is rewritten as ζ + α = g0(aP ), or aP =
g0−1(ζ + α) = ψ(ζ + α).
Now, repeating a procedure similar to that in the proof of Proposition 2, we can derive the
following proposition, which summarizes the optimal contract under double moral hazard.
Proposition 3: Suppose that the manager cannot observe {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τT0I}. For
any starting value W0 ∈ [R, WI ], the optimal contract is characterized by the unique concave
function eF (W ) (≥ G(W ) − K) that satisfies the HJB equation
r eF (W ) = max
aP=ψ(ζ+α),Y≥β0(aP )
1 + (ζ + α)aP − g(aP ) + eF 0(W )γW + eF 00(W )
2
Y 2σ2, (10)
with β0(aP ) = h1+αaP and boundary conditions eF (R) = L0, eF (WI) = G(WI) − K, andeF 0(WI) = G0(WI). When Wt ∈ [R, WI ], dCt = 0. This means that WI ≤ W+. The IPO
takes place when Wt reaches WI, or the contract is terminated when Wt hits R, whichever
happens sooner. After the IPO, the continuation contract is given by Proposition 1 at the
starting value WI. Then, the optimal contract attains profit eF (W0) for the principal.20
Again, as eF 00(W ) < 0, the principal optimally chooses Y = β0(aP ) = h1+αaP in (10).
We next compare the optimal choices of W++, WI , and aP under double moral hazard
with those under single moral hazard. Under double (or single) moral hazard, let fW++∗ andfW ∗I (or W++∗ and W ∗I ) denote the corresponding cash payment and value-maximizing IPO
thresholds, respectively.
We begin by discussing the optimal choices of W++ and aP . First, as in single moral
hazard, the manager is never paid before the IPO under double moral hazard. Furthermore,
even under double moral hazard, the choice rule ofW++ is given by Proposition 1. As G(W )
is the same irrespective of single or double moral hazard, we see fW++∗ = W++∗. Second,
20For the starting value of W0 > WI , the IPO is immediately executed or contracts with positive profit
do not exist.
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because the optimality implies ζ + α = g0(aP ) under double moral hazard but ζ + α <
g0(aP ) under single moral hazard if α > 0, it follows from g00 > 0 that aP is smaller under
double moral hazard than under single moral hazard.
The above discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4: (i) The manager is never paid before the IPO, irrespective of single or
double moral hazard. In addition, the optimal cash payment threshold is not affected by the
contractibility of the principal’s effort: fW++∗ = W++∗.
(ii) Double moral hazard induces the principal to undersupply her own effort relative to the
case of single moral hazard.
Several remarks on Proposition 4 are in order. First, Philippon and Sannikov (2007)
suggest that under single moral hazard, the manager is not paid until a certain period
after the IPO. Proposition 4(i) confirms their finding even under double moral hazard. This
finding also suggests that the optimal contract is not linear under the continuous-time agency
model with double moral hazard. By contrast, in the static agency model with double moral
hazard, Romano (1994) and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) show that a simple linear
contract with a fixed fee implements the second-best outcome when the agent is risk neutral.
Our result depends on the possibility of contract termination under the manager’s limited
liability, which is not considered in their model.
Second, for the choice of aP , if the manager cannot observe aP , the principal cannot
commit to considering the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint in choosing her own
effort after the compensation contract has been offered. Hence, the principal cannot inter-
nalize the external effect of her own effort on the manager’s incentives. As a result, the
noncontractibility of the principal’s effort leads to an undersupply of aP .
We next explore how the contractibility of the principal’s effort affects the IPO threshold.
The result is novel because Philippon and Sannikov (2007) consider only the single moral
hazard case.
Proposition 5: For all W ≥ R, eF (W ) < F (W ). In addition, the optimal IPO timing is
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earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard: fW ∗I < W ∗I .
Intuitively, eF (W ) is smaller than F (W ) because the principal cannot provide an appro-
priate ex post incentive for herself under double moral hazard. However, G(W ) is the same,
irrespective of single or double moral hazard. This implies that the net expected payoff
of the principal obtained when postponing the IPO is always smaller under double moral
hazard than under single moral hazard ( eF (W ) − [G(W ) − K] < F (W ) − [G(W ) − K] for
all W ≥ R). Because the IPO does not take place until the expected present value of the
principal’s profit ( eF (W ) or F (W )) meets her profit from the IPO (G(W ) − K), it follows
from the boundary conditions of (8) and (10) and the concavity of eF (W ), F (W ), and G(W )
that the IPO threshold is lower under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard.
Combining Propositions 4(i) and 5, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6: The manager’s compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral
hazard than under single moral hazard.
Hence, the manager’s compensation as a function of performance history depends on whether
the principal’s effort is observable, even though the manager’s compensation as a function
of W is not (These points are suggested by an anonymous referee).
5. Comparative Statics under Double Moral Hazard
Using Propositions 1 and 3, we compute the comparative statics on the IPO and man-
agerial compensation policies in the optimal contract under double moral hazard. Table 1
summarizes our results. The derivation procedures are provided in the Appendix. As in
Proposition 6, by combining the results of fW++∗ and fW ∗I in Table 1, we also derive the
following result: the larger is α (or the larger is μ), the later the manager’s compensation
tends to be paid (or earlier if ∂G(W )∂μ >
1
r
for all W ≥ R and if dμ is sufficiently small).
The intuition for the results of fW++∗ is as follows. First, as discussed after Proposi-
tion 1, the payment to the manager is postponed until the new outside investors’ and the
manager’s required expected returns, rG(W ) + γW , exhaust the available expected cash
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flows, μ. Indeed, an increase in μ not only raises the stream of the expected cash flows, μ,
but also reduces the cost of the principal exposing the manager to income uncertainty to
provide incentives because it reduces the variation inW by relaxing the manager’s incentive-
compatibility constraint. Thus, when μ increases, rG(W ) increases. On the other hand, an
increase in μ raises μ − γW . However, if ∂G(W )∂μ is greater than 1r , an increase in μ raises
rG(W ) more than μ − γW . Thus, fW++∗ needs to be reduced because rG0(fW++∗) + γ = γ
− r > 0. Second, an increase in σ2 reduces G(W ) because it directly increases the variation
in W . This induces new outside investors to choose the higher fW++∗.
We next explain the intuition for the results of fW ∗I . First, an increase in α directly
increases eF (W ) because it raises the stream of expected cash flows (1 + (ζ + α)aP ) and also
reduces the cost of exposing the manager to income uncertainty by reducing the variation in
W through the relaxation of the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint. However, an
increase in α does not affect G(W ). As the principal’s profit obtained when postponing the
IPO becomes larger relative to her profit generated from the IPO, fW ∗I increases with α.
Second, an increase in μ raises G(W ). This effect also increases eF (W ) because the prin-
cipal’s profit from the IPO is equal to G(W ) − K. In fact, if dμ is sufficiently small, G(W )
increases with μ more rapidly than eF (W ) near the IPO threshold. The reason is that the
direct effect of an increase in μ only raises the expected cash flows of the firm after the
IPO, thus increasing G(W ). This implies that near the IPO threshold, the principal’s profit
generated from the IPO (G(W ) − K) is more sensitive to μ than her profit obtained when
postponing the IPO ( eF (W )). Hence, if dμ is sufficiently small, the principal is more likely
to speed up the IPO timing as μ increases: fW ∗I is decreasing in μ.21
Third, an increase in σ2 reduces G(W ). This effect also decreases eF (W ) because the
21Clementi (2002) builds a discrete-time model of the optimal IPO decision and suggests that private
firms with a larger positive productivity shock are more likely to go public. Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig
(2005) consider a simple value function model of optimal IPO timing. They predict that firms go public when
cash flow is high. Pástor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009) develop a continuous-time model of the optimal IPO
decision with learning about average profitability under no moral hazard. They show that if both investors
and the entrepreneur are risk averse, an IPO is more likely at some prespecified time when the expected
profitability and the volatility of profitability are higher. However, their qualitative results on the likelihood
of an IPO depend on the assumption that IPO timing is exogenously given.
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principal’s profit from the IPO decreases. On the other hand, an increase in σ2 directly
reduces eF (W ) because it increases the variation in W . Note that the first effect on G(W )
increases fW ∗I , whereas the second and third effects on eF (W ) decrease fW ∗I . In fact, if r and
dσ2 are sufficiently small, the first and second effects cancel each other out. Thus, only the
third effect remains near the IPO threshold. Hence, fW ∗I is decreasing in σ2.22
One of the interesting results obtained here is that the IPO threshold fW ∗I is decreasing in
σ2 if r and dσ2 are sufficiently small. Philippon and Sannikov (2007) extend the continuous-
time cash diversion model of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). They assume that a standard
Brownian motion represents a signal regarding the action of the manager rather than the cu-
mulative cash flow. They indicate that the IPO threshold is increasing in the volatility of the
signal. By contrast, we show that the IPO threshold is decreasing in the risk of the project
(equal to the volatility of the cumulative cash flow) under certain conditions. Intuitively, in
their cash diversion model, there is no difference between the incentive-compatibility con-
straints for the manager before and after the IPO. However, in our double moral hazard
model, differences exist between these constraints before and after the IPO. The differences
mainly result from the complementarity between the principal’s and the manager’s efforts be-
fore the IPO. As a result, and in contrast to the model in Philippon and Sannikov (2007), the
net expected profit of the principal obtained when postponing the IPO ( eF (W )) is decreasing
in σ2 for all W ≥ R in our model, thus generating the different result.
6. Model of the VC Not Exiting the Firm Following the IPO
In the previous sections, we considered the case where the principal (the VC) exits com-
pletely with the IPO. In this section, we assume that for reasons not modeled in this analysis,
the VC retains a fraction of ω (< ω) of the firm’s shares and provides effort to increase the
productivity of the firm even after the IPO. However, the firm is under the control of new
outside investors because the VC must set ω sufficiently small in order to recover the funds
22See footnote 21.
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invested for future investment opportunities or to finance the investment cost K for expand-
ing the scale of the firm. Furthermore, as the new outside investors cannot observe either the
manager’s effort or the principal’s effort, they need to design an optimal incentive scheme
in a multiagent environment following the IPO, regardless of whether we assume single or
double moral hazard before the IPO.
Here, we assume that the drift of the cash flows after the IPO is given by ANt = μ(aAt +
ζaPt + αaAtaPt). Then, the manager’s total expected payoff at t = 0 is still written by (2),






















¢−K¸+ e−rτT1 (1− ω)L1¸¾ .
(11)
Note that the profit of the principal from the IPO equals the total expected payoff for new
outside investors at t = τ I , which is shown by the terms in the third line in (11).
In designing the optimal incentive scheme after the IPO, for simplicity we assume that
there is no colluding agreement between the principal and the manager, and that if there
are multiple effort processes of {(aAt, aPt) ∈ AA×AP , τ I ≤ t <∞} as Nash equilibrium for
the principal and the manager, new outside investors can implement their most preferred
effort processes from among those effort processes. In addition, new outside investors cannot
offer the principal or the manager a contract contingent on the manager’s report of aP
even when the manager can observe aP . This assumption can be justified because such
contracts are not found in practice. Assumption 1 is still assumed to hold. Again, we
assume that implementing aA(Wt) = 1 is always optimal.23 In the Appendix, we provide a
formal characterization of the optimal contract. Here, we briefly summarize the results, and
23The sufficient condition for such optimality is shown in Hori and Osano (2013).
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discuss whether our main results in Sections 4 and 5 are unaffected by this extension.
First, Propositions 4—6 regarding the difference between the features of the optimal con-
tracts under single and double moral hazard continue to hold. Second, Table 2 gives the
comparative statics under double moral hazard in this situation, where GO (GP ) and fW++∗O
denote the value function of new outside investors (the principal) and the optimal cash pay-
ment threshold. The main difference between the results in Tables 1 and 2 is that Table 2
includes the effect of α even after the IPO and the effects of ω before and after the IPO. Com-
bining the results offW++∗O andfW ∗I in Table 2, we also derive the following result: The larger
is μ, the earlier the manager’s compensation tends to be paid if ∂GO(W )∂μ > ∂[(1−ω)A
N∗∗(W )]
∂μ for
all W ≥ R and if dμ is sufficiently small, where AN∗∗(W ) = μ[1 + (ζ + α)a∗∗P (W )].
The intuition for the results of α after the IPO can be explained in a way similar to that
in the case of μ in Section 5. The effect of α on fW ∗I becomes more complicated because
an increase in α raises GO(W ) + GP (W ). However, if r and dα are sufficiently small, the
increasing effect of α on eF (W ) dominates the increasing effect of α on GO(W ) + GP (W ).
Thus, fW ∗I increases with α. For the result of ω on fW ∗I , an increase in ω increases GO(W ) +
GP (W ) because it not only raises the stream of expected cash flows by inducing the higher
aP after the IPO but also reduces the variation in W by providing the manager with more
incentive to work through the complementarity effect of the higher aP . In fact, an increase
in ω increases eF (W ) because the sum of the principal’s profits at and after the IPO equals
GO(W ) + GP (W ) − K. However, if dω is sufficiently small, the principal’s profit generated
from the IPO (GO(W ) + GP (W ) − K) is more sensitive to μ than that obtained when
postponing the IPO ( eF (W )) near the IPO threshold. Hence, fW ∗I is decreasing in ω.
To summarize, the possibility of the VC not exiting the firm completely with the IPO
invokes a multiagent setting when new outside investors cannot observe either the VC’s or
the manager’s effort. However, most of our main conclusions continue to hold, even in this
case. Therefore, our main results do not depend on the assumption that the principal (VC)
completely exits with the IPO.
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7. Empirical Implications
We begin by proposing empirical implications for the IPO timing, using the comparative
static results regarding the IPO threshold.
(A) An IPO is likely to be earlier the less the need for the VC’s monitoring role, the greater
the increment in future expected cash flows, the higher the volatility of cash flows, and the
larger the equity claim of the VC after the IPO.
Using US manufacturing firm data, Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2010) report that firms
with higher sales growth and higher total factor productivity are more likely to go public.
This finding is consistent with our implication that the IPO is likely to be earlier when
the increment in future expected cash flows increases. Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2010)
also suggest that firms in industries characterized by riskier cash flows are more likely to go
public. Hsu (2013) shows that VCs shorten the incubation period and take their portfolio
companies public when technological change at the industry level is greater. These findings
are consistent with our implication that the IPO is likely to be earlier the higher the volatility
of cash flows. Our implications concerning the need for the VC’s monitoring role and the
post-IPO equity position of the VC provide new testable predictions. The need for the VC’s
monitoring role can be measured by several indexes. For example, Lee and Wahal (2004)
suggest that venture financing is disproportionately provided to firms in technology-intensive
industries, in particular software and commercial biological research. They also indicate that
VCs generally take smaller and younger firms public. These findings imply that the VC’s
monitoring role is needed more in firms in technology-intensive industries, smaller firms, and
younger firms. Hence, our theory predicts that an IPO is likely to be later in these kinds of
firms, where the VC’s effort is more important.
A large number of IPOs do not necessarily have any VC contract relationships. Although
our present model cannot suitably deal with the decision as to whether an entrepreneur
and a VC make a contract relationship, our theory implies that firms with a high initial
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continuation value of the managerW0 (> WI) undertake the IPO immediately. If larger and
mature firms have a higher W0, this suggests that larger and mature firms need not receive
the VC’s support for undertaking the IPO, which is consistent with the empirical findings
of Lee and Wahal (2004).24
Our theory also derives new implications for the managerial compensation profile, using
the comparative static results regarding the cash payment and IPO thresholds.
(B) Managerial compensation will tend to be paid later, the smaller the increment in future
expected cash flows, if the discounted expected profit of new outside investors to equity is
more sensitive to this increment than the firm’s expected productivity. In addition, man-
agerial compensation will tend to be paid later after the IPO, the higher the volatility of
cash flows, and the less acute the need for the VC’s monitoring role if the discounted ex-
pected profit of new outside investors to equity is more sensitive to this need than the firm’s
expected productivity.
It is common for VC—entrepreneur relationships to include vesting provisions (see Kaplan
and Strömberg (2003)). Our implications are novel in providing testable predictions that
time vesting is used more the smaller the increment in future expected cash flows, and that
it is also used more after the IPO the larger the volatility of cash flows and the less the need
for the VC’s monitoring role.
Under our optimal contract, the manager cannot receive any payment before the IPO nor
any lump-sum payment at the IPO. Instead, the manager can receive a lump-sum payment
only after the IPO. Practically, this delay of payment can be interpreted as a lockup period
during which the manager may not sell his shares for a period of time after the IPO. In
24There are several empirical findings of long-run post-IPO underperformance (for example, see Ritter
(1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) for the negative abnormal returns after the IPO, and Pástor, Taylor,
and Veronesi (2009) for the lower profitability after the IPO). Even in our model, we show that eF (W ) ≥
G(W ) − K (or eF (W ) ≥ GO(W ) + GP (W ) − K) for all W ≥ R under the optimal contract. Hence, if the
firm must promise to expend K at the time of the IPO but real expenditure evolves only gradually after
the IPO and if the manager’s continuation value W can be fully controlled under the estimating equation,
our model suggests that the post-IPO performance of the firm is not better than the pre-IPO one from the
point of view of the negative abnormal returns after the IPO.
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any case, our model indicates that the contract can specify a large payment for the manager
around the IPO. Furthermore, the VC has recently been more likely to exit through the sale
of its portfolio firm to another company (M&A) than through the IPO.25 As mentioned in
the introduction, our model can be applied to the case where the VC exits through M&A.
In this case, the manager is less likely to receive a large lump-sum payment at the exit of
the VC.26 Thus, the result that the manager does not receive any lump-sum payment at the
exit of the VC does not restrict the explanatory power of our model.
Because the role of the VC can also be played by buyout funds or banks, our statements (A)
and (B) with the associated arguments apply not only to IPOs or M&A for early-stage start-
up firms but also to IPOs orM&A involving the relisting of management buyout firms or firms
reorganized following bankruptcy.27 Our model also allows us to derive new implications for
the dissolution of joint ventures or corporate spin-offs. In the case of corporate spin-off, a
parent company separates one of its subsidiaries from itself, sells the equity of the subsidiary
to its own shareholders, and makes the subsidiary a new entity that is managed independently
of the parent company. Thus, if the parent company’s CEO (principal) attempts to maximize
the expected payoff of the existing shareholders, the process is well characterized by the
model in which the principal completely exits upon the spin-off timing. Daley, Mehrotra,
and Sivakumar (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) find that the number of focus-increasing
spin-offs is more than twice that of non-focus-increasing spin-offs. Ahn and Walker (2007)
also report that diversified firms with more effective corporate governance are more likely to
conduct spin-offs. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that a spin-off is likely
to be earlier the smaller the need for the parent company’s involvement.
25See Ball, Chiu, and Smith (2011) and Yearbook 2012, National Venture Capital Association.
26A VC states that the case in which the manager receives a large lump-sum payment at M&A is usually
the case in which he quits the firm at M&A. Hence, except for this golden-parachute case, the manager
is less likely to receive a large lump-sum payment at the exit of the VC via M&A. As our model focuses
on the case in which the manager remains in the firm even after the VC exits, we can neglect this kind of
golden-parachute case.
27M&A is also the most common route for the exit of buyout funds. See Kaplan and Strömberg (2009).
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8. Conclusion
We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard in which an agent
provides unobservable effort whereas a principal (advisor) supplies unobservable effort and
chooses an optimal exit timing with irreversible investment. We take an example in which a
VC or buyout fund and a manager jointly exert an unobservable level of effort to develop a
project before the firm goes public to finance irreversible investment and the VC or buyout
fund exits. We show that the optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard
than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager’s compensation
tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static
results; in particular, the IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is
smaller and the volatility of cash flows is larger. Furthermore, we argue that even where
the VC or buyout fund does not completely exit with the IPO, most of our main results
remain unaffected. In addition, our model can be applied to not only the dissolution of joint
ventures but also corporate spin-offs.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Our contract model after the IPO is essentially similar to the
hidden effort model of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006, Section III). The difference is that
the manager’s action increases cash flows in our model, whereas it decreases cash flows
in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). Hence, we prove the statement of this proposition by
applying a procedure similar to that of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006).
The remaining problem is to derive a sufficient condition for the optimality of implementing
aA(Wt) = 1 at any t ∈ [τ I , τT1 ]. When the contract induces the manager to shirk, his promised
payoff would evolve according to dWt = (γWt − h)dt − dCt + β1σdZt. For aA(Wt) = 1
to be optimal at any t ∈ [τ I , τT1], the expected payoff rate of new outside investors from
letting the manager shirk would be less than that under our existing contract for all W ∈
[R, W++]:
rG(W ) ≥ G0(W )(γW − h). (A1)
The manager’s and the principal’s expected payoffs if the manager shirks forever are given
by WS = hγ and G




G0(W )(WS −W ) ≥ 0. (A2)
Applying a procedure similar to that of Proposition 8 in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), we
can prove that a sufficient condition for (A2) is γ
r
G(W S) + (1 − γ
r
)G(WmaxG) ≥ 0, where
WmaxG denotes the value of W that achieves the greatest value of G(W ) in the range of W
∈ [R, W++]. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we can prove that the evolution of Wt and the incentive-
compatibility condition are represented by (7) and Y (Wt) ≥ β0(aP (Wt)) for t ∈ [0, τT0I ]
using a procedure similar to that in the proofs for Propositions 1 and 2 in the Appendix in
Sannikov (2008).
We next consider the following HJB equation:
rF (W ) = max
aP∈AP ,Y≥β0(aP ),dC





Then, we prove the regulatory properties of F (W ) in (A3).
Lemma A1: The solutions to (A3) exist and are unique and continuous in initial condi-
tions F (W ) and F 0(W ). In addition, initial conditions with F 00(W ) < 0 result in a concave
function.
Proof: Using a procedure similar to that in the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix in
Sannikov (2008), we can show the first statement. To prove the second statement, let





Y 2σ2 . Then, F
00(W ) =
H(F (W ), F 0(W ),W ). We can show that if ever H(F, F 0,W ) = 0 on the path of a solu-
tion, the corresponding solution must be F (W 0) = F (W ) + γ
r
(W 0 − W )F 0(W ). To see
this, we must verify that H(F + γ
r
(W 0 −W )F 0, F 0,W 0) = 0 for all W , W 0 ≥ R. Indeed,
H(F + γ
r
(W 0 −W )F 0, F 0,W 0) = min
aP∈AP ,Y≥β0(aP ),dC









Y 2σ2 =H(F, F
0,W ) = 0. However, if F (W 0) = F (W )
+ γ
r




F 0(W ), for all W , W 0 ≥ R. As W 0 → W , this implies that F 0(W ) = γ
r
F 0(W ), which
contradicts γ > r. Hence, the second derivative of the solution can never reach zero. We
thus verify that a solution with a negative second derivative at one point must be concave
everywhere. k
We proceed to examine the existence and uniqueness of the solution that solves (A3) with
the boundary conditions of (8).
Lemma A2: There exists a unique concave function F (W ) ≥ G(W ) − K that solves (A3)
with the boundary conditions of (8) for some WI > R.
Proof: Let us consider the solutions of (A3) with F (R) = L0 and various slopes G0(R) >
F 0(R). By Lemma A1, all of these solutions are unique and continuous in F 0(R). It also
follows from Lemma A1 and G00(W ) < 0 for W ∈ [R, W++) that all of these solutions are
concave if they satisfy F (WI) = G(WI) − K and F 0(WI) = G0(WI).28 Because F (R) = L0
> L1 − K = G(R) − K by Assumption 1, it is evident that WI > R. Now, as G0(R) >
F 0(R), the resulting solution F (W ) must reach G(W ) − K at some point WI ∈ (R, ∞), as
typically shown in Figure 1. k
We next prove that dCt = 0 for any t ∈ [0, τT0I ].
28If F 00(W ) ≥ 0 for allW ≥ R, then F (W ) > G(W ) − K for allW ∈ (WI , W++], which is a contradiction.
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Lemma A3: WI ≤W+. Thus, dCt = 0 for all Wt ∈ [R, WI ]
Proof: If WI > W+, then WI − W+ must be paid as soon as the IPO is done. Thus, the
principal’s profit from the IPO is reduced to G(W+) − K. However, it follows from WI
> W+ and F (W ) > G(W ) − K for all W ∈ [R, WI) that F (W+) > G(W+) − K, which
means that the IPO should not be done. Thus, we must have WI ≤ W+. Then, it follows
from F 0(W ) ≥ −1 and the definition of W+ that dCt = 0 for all Wt ∈ [R, WI ]. k
Now, we conjecture an optimal contract from the solution of (8).
Lemma A4: Consider the unique solution F (W ) ≥ G(W ) − K that solves (8) and satisfies
the boundary conditions of (8) for some WI > R. Let aP : [R, WI ] → AP and Y : [R, WI ]
→ [β0, ∞] be the maximizers in (8); in particular, Y (Wt) = β0(aP (Wt)) = h1+αaP (Wt) . For
any starting condition W0 ∈ [R, WI ], there is a unique in the sense of probability law weak
solution to the following equation:
dWt = γWtdt+ β0(aP (Wt)){dXt − [1 + (ζ + α)aP (Wt)]dt}, (A4)
until time τT0I. The process of the manager’s and the principal’s efforts {aA(·), aP (·)} ≡
{aA(W ), aP (W ) : W ∈ [R,WI ]} is defined by aAt = 1, aPt = aP (Wt), and Yt = β0(aP (Wt))
for t ∈ [0, τT0I) and for t = τT0I and WτT0I = WI; and aAt = 0, aPt = 0, and Yt = 0
for t ≥ τT0I and WτT0I = R. This process is incentive compatible, and has value W0 to the
manager and the expected present value of the profit F (W0) to the principal.
Proof: There is a weak solution of (A4) that is unique in the sense of probability law because
the drift of Wt is bounded on [R, WI ] and the volatility is bounded above 0 by h1+αaP (Wt)σ.
Note that aP (Wt) ∈ AP and AP is a compact set. Now, using a procedure similar to that
in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix in Sannikov (2008), we can verify that the
principal obtains the profit F (W0). k
We finally show the following lemma.
Lemma A5: Consider a concave solution F (W ) of the HJB equation that satisfies (8) with
the boundary conditions of (8). Any incentive-compatible contract Π achieves the expected
present value of the profit of at most F (W0).
Proof: Applying the standard procedure of justifying the optimal contract (for example,
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see DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Sannikov (2008), and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang
(2012)), we can prove this lemma (see Hori and Osano (2013)). k
Combining Lemmas A1—A5, we establish the statement of Proposition 2.
The remaining problem is to derive a sufficient condition for the optimality of implement-
ing aA(Wt) = 1 at any t ∈ [0, τT0I ]. Repeating a procedure similar to that of the proof of
Proposition 1 in this Appendix, we can prove that a sufficient condition for the optimality
is γ
r
F (WS) + (1 − γ
r
)F (WmaxF ) ≥ 0, where WmaxF denotes the value of W that achieves
the greatest value of F (W ) in the range of [R, WI ].29 ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 in this Appendix.
Hence, we omit most of the proof and only provide the following sufficient condition for the
optimality of implementing aA(Wt) = 1 at any t ∈ [0, τT0I ]: γr eF (WS) + (1 − γr ) eF (Wmax F )
≥ 0, where Wmax F denotes the value of W that achieves the greatest value of eF (W ) in the
range of [R, WI ]. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Comparing (10) with (8), we see that the only difference be-
tween the HJB equations and boundary conditions under double and single moral hazard is
that the right-hand side of (10) is maximized subject to the principal’s moral hazard con-
straint at each level of W , whereas the right-hand side of (8) is not. Hence, eF (W ) < F (W )
for all W ≥ R. In addition, using the boundary conditions of (8) and (10), G00(W ) < 0,
F 00(W ) < 0, eF 00(W ) < 0, F (W ) > G(W ) − K for W ∈ [R, W ∗I ), and eF (W ) > G(W ) − K
for W ∈ [R, fW ∗I ), it follows that fW ∗I < W ∗I if eF (W ) − G(W ) < F (W ) − G(W ) for all W
≥ R. Thus, it is evident from eF (W ) < F (W ) that fW ∗I < W ∗I . ¥
Proofs for the Comparative Static Results in Section 5: We begin with the case
after the IPO. Applying procedures similar to those in the proofs for Lemmas 4 and 6 in the
Appendix in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or the proof for Lemma 3 in the Appendix in
29For simplicity, we assume that ζ < g0(0). Hence, if the manager shirks forever, it is not optimal for the
principal to supply any of her own effort.
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, θ = μ,σ2. (A5)
Note that β1 = hμ and G (R) = L1 atW = R. It follows from (A5) that ∂G(W )∂μ > 0 and ∂G(W )∂σ2
< 0. It also follows from (6), G0(W++) = −1, and G00(W++) = 0 that rG(W++) + γW++
= μ. Differentiating this condition with γ > r, G0(W++) = −1, ∂G(W )∂μ > 0, and ∂G(W )∂σ2 < 0,





for all W ≥ R, and that ∂W++∗∂σ2 > 0.
We next consider the case before the IPO. Repeating the procedure used above, we have





∙∂ [1 + (ζ + α)aP (Wt)− g(aP (Wt))]
∂θ +
∂ (γWt)

















, θ = μ,σ2,α. (A6)
Note that β0(aP ) = h1+αaP , ζ + α = g0(aP ), eF (R) = L0 atW = R, and eF (WτI ) = G(WτI ) −
K at W = WτI . It follows from (A5) and (A6) that
∂ F (W )
∂μ > 0 and
∂ F (W )
∂σ2 < 0. Given ζ + α
= g0(aP ), we obtain
∂ F (W )
∂α > 0. It also follows from the boundary conditions of (10), eF 00(W )
< 0, G00(W ) < 0, and eF (W ) > G(W ) − K for all W ∈ [R, WI) that for θ = α, μ, and σ2,
∂W∗I∂θ R 0 if
∂[ F (W )−G(W )]
∂θ R 0 for allW ∈ [R, WI). In particular, when θ = α, we obtain ∂G(W )∂α
= 0. Thus, using ∂ F (W )∂α > 0, this implies that
∂W∗I∂α > 0. Regarding θ = μ and σ2, we focus
on the perturbation in the small neighborhood of W = WτI (≡ WI) when τ I < τT0 . For θ =
μ, it follows from (A5) and (A6) that ∂[ F (W )−G(W )]∂μ
¯¯¯¯
W=WτI




dμ is sufficiently small. Thus, ∂W∗I∂μ < 0 if dμ is sufficiently small. For θ = σ2, it follows from















i2 eF 00 (WτI ). In fact, on the right-hand side of the
above relation, the first term has a higher order of r than the second term. As this implies




< 0, we have ∂
W∗I∂σ2 < 0 if r and dσ2 are sufficiently small. ¥
Appendix for Section 6: Regardless of single or double moral hazard before the IPO, we
can prove that there exists a progressively measurable process {Yt,Ft : τ I ≤ t ≤ τT1} in L∗
such that
dWt = {γWt − h · [1− aA(Wt)]} dt−dCt+Y (Wt){dXt−μ[aA(Wt)+ζaP (Wt)+αaA(Wt)aP (Wt)]dt},
for every t ∈ [τ I , τT1]. Then, the incentive-compatibility constraint for the manager imple-
menting the high effort after the IPO is summarized by Y = η1(aP ), where η1(aP ) ≡ min {y
: yμ(1 + αaP ) ≥ h} = hμ(1+αaP ) .
Let GO(W ) and GP (W ) denote the value functions of new outside investors and the
principal after the IPO, respectively. The optimal compensation policy is still determined
by dC = max (W −W++O , 0), where W++O is the lowest value of W such that G0O(W ) = −1.
As GO(W ) does not depend on whether there is single or double moral hazard before the
IPO, and neither does W++O .
Then, we can derive the following HJB equations after the IPO. First, for any WI ∈ [R,
W++O ], there is the unique concave function GO(W ) that satisfies
rGO(W ) = max
aP=ψ(ωμ(ζ+α)),Y≥η1(aP )





where ψ(ωμ(ζ + α)) is given below (A9), and the boundary conditions are represented by
GO(R) = (1 − ω)L1, G0O(W++O ) = −1, and G00O(W++O ) = 0.30 Second, for any WI ∈ [R,
W++O ], there is the unique concave function GP (W ) that satisfies
rGP (W ) = max
aP∈AP





with the boundary conditions of GP (R) = ωL1 and G0P (W++O ) = 0 (for the derivation pro-
cedure of (A8) and the boundary conditions, see Hori and Osano (2013)).
30As the smooth-pasting and super contract conditions are the same as those in the model of DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006), we can prove the concavity of GO(W ) as in Proposition 1.
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Now, the principal optimally chooses her effort after the IPO as
aP = argmax
aP∈AP




[Y (W )]2 σ2. (A9)
Note that Y (W ) = η1(aP (W )) = hμ[1+αaP (W )] , where aP (W ) is given by the recommended
principal’s effort at each point ofW after the IPO. If we assume that ωμ(ζ + α) > g0(0), the
incentive-compatibility constraint for the principal after the IPO is represented by ωμ(ζ+α)
= g0(aP ) or aP = g0−1(ωμ(ζ + α)) = ψ(ωμ(ζ + α)).
Similarly, we derive the HJB equations before the IPO. Note that the evolution of Wt is
still given by (7), irrespective of single or double moral hazard. Hence, if the manager can
observe and verify {aPt ∈ AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I}, the unique concave function F (W ) (≥ GO(W )
+ GP (W ) − K) satisfies
rF (W ) = max
aP∈AP ,Y≥β0(aP )




with β0(aP ) = h1+αaP and the boundary conditions of F (R) = L0, F (WI) = GO(WI) +
GP (WI) − K, and F 0(WI) = G0O(WI) + G0P (WI). If the manager cannot observe {aPt ∈
AP , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ I}, the unique concave function eF (W ) (≥ GO(W ) + GP (W ) − K) satisfies
r eF (W ) = max
aP=ψ(ζ+α),Y≥β0(aP )
1 + (ζ + α)aP − g(aP ) + eF 0(W )γW + eF 00(W )
2
Y 2σ2, (A11)
where ψ(ζ + α) = g0−1(ζ + α) and the boundary conditions are given by eF (R) = L0, eF (WI)
= GO(WI) + GP (WI) − K, and eF 0(WI) = G0O(WI) + G0P (WI). ¥
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Table 1: Comparative Statics under Double Moral Hazard When the VC
Exits the Firm Following the IPO
θ α μ σ2
After the IPO
∂G (W ) /∂θ 0 > 0 < 0
∂fW++∗/∂θ 0 < 0a > 0
Before the IPO
∂ eF (W ) /∂θ > 0 > 0 < 0
∂fW ∗I /∂θ > 0 < 0b < 0c
Notes:
a We assume that ∂G(W )∂μ >
1
r
for all W ≥ R.
b We assume that dμ is sufficiently small.
c We assume that r and dσ2 are sufficiently small.
1
Table 2: Comparative Statics under Double Moral Hazard When the VC
Does Not Exit the Firm Following the IPO
θ α μ σ2 ω
After the IPO
∂GO (W ) /∂θ > 0 > 0 < 0 ?
∂fW++∗O /∂θ < 0a < 0b > 0 ?
Before the IPO
∂ eF (W ) /∂θ > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0
∂fW ∗I /∂θ > 0c < 0d < 0c < 0d
Notes:
a We assume that ∂GO(W )∂α >
∂[(1−ω)AN∗∗(W )]
∂α , where A
N∗∗ (W ) = μ[1 +
(ζ + α)a∗∗P (W )].
b We assume that ∂GO(W )∂μ >
∂[(1−ω)AN∗∗(W )]
∂μ .
c We assume that r and dθ are sufficiently small for θ = α and σ2.
d We assume that dθ is sufficiently small for θ = μ and ω.
2

